



Unified Quest 2004 War Game (UQ 04) A Marine Perspective



2-7 May 2004

INTRODUCTION

The *Unified Quest 04 (UQ 04)* War Game was conducted 2-7 May 2004 at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. It was the second annual co-sponsored Army and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Title X War Game that was formally known as the *Army Transformation War Game (ATWG)*. *UQ 04* integrated Army and JFCOM efforts to address significant future interoperability problems among the Services and the Joint community.

The focus of *UQ 04* was expanding the power of Coherent Joint Operations. The overarching Army/JFCOM goal for *UQ 04* was to explore concepts and capabilities that enable the emerging Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC).

Significant *UQ 04* Pathway events are reflected in Figure 1 below:




Figure 1: *UQ 04* Related Pathway Events

UQ 04 CENTRAL STUDY QUESTION. Identify the concepts and capabilities required to counteract an adversary who, having lost most of his conventional capability, seeks decision through a combination of protracted, unconventional operations and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) employment. The related game Analysis Question: How does the Joint Force conduct and sustain simultaneous distributed maneuver in a non-contiguous battlespace?

JFCOM / ARMY UQ 04 OBJECTIVES

Explore concepts for the application of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational capabilities:

1. Major Combat Operations: Explore concepts for the application of national, joint, combined, and Service capabilities to defeat adversary forces and establish stable conditions for conflict termination to inform the Major Combat Operations (MCO) Joint Operating Concept.
2. Transition to Post Conflict: Explore concepts for the application of national, joint, combined, and service capabilities to transition from decisive operations to conflict termination and post-conflict operations to inform MCO and Stability Operations Joint Operating Concepts.
3. Stability Operations: Explore the concepts, capabilities, and force designs required to conduct simultaneous major combat and stability operations in a distributed, non-contiguous battlespace to inform the Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept.
4. Network Enabled Battle Command: Explore network enabled battle command and the Army Unit of Employment ability to conduct shaping and decisive operations in urban terrain in order to support the MCO and Stability Operations Joint Operating Concepts.

USMC UQ 04 OBJECTIVES

1. Examine Enhanced Network Seabase support capabilities for the Joint Force.
2. Examine the role of Naval Forces during the transition from major combat operations to stabilization and post conflict operations.
3. Highlight USMC transformational concepts, platforms, and capabilities, and protect USMC “equities.”

USMC PARTICIPATION

Seven Subject Matter Expert (SME) participants represented the Marine Corps in *UQ 04*.

USMC Game Participants:

| <u>SME Billet</u> | <u>Supporting Organization</u> |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Sumesia Theater MARFOR CMDR Red Team | MCRSC/MARFORRES MCWL/Wargaming |
| Nair Theater MARFOR CMDR MARFOR - GCE Red Team | MCCDC/ EFDC MCCDC/ EFDC MCCDC/ JCDE South |
| Assessors Sumesia Nair Theater | MCWL/ Plans MCCDC/ JCDE South |

GAME CONSTRUCT

UQ 04 was structured around four Operational Panels, illustrated in Figure 2 below. Each Operational Panel consisted of a Red Team, Blue Team, and an Assessment Team. The scenarios were a continuation of those used in *UQ 03*, set in the 2016 timeframe, and played at the UNCLASSIFIED level. They included a MCO in NAIR, a fictitious country in Southwest Asia, and a Lesser Contingency in SUMESIA, a fictitious country in Southeast Asia.

1. NAIR Major Combat Operation (MCO)


a. The NAIR scenario involved three separate operational planning cells (NAIR A, B & C) each designed to explore various Army structure concepts. The NAIR A Cell was primarily composed of students from the Army Command and General Staff College. They were tasked with fighting the NAIR scenario at the tactical level. The staff examined current capabilities, Future Concepts, and Task Force Modularity designs. The NAIR B Cell focused on the employment of Army Units of Action (UA) in a tactical level, urban fight. The NAIR C Cell, with imbedded Marine planners, focused on the capabilities and concepts necessary to fight at the operational level of war in 2016 and beyond.

b. The Campaign Plan for Joint Operations in NAIR involved a CJTF that employed six operational maneuver Task Forces simultaneously throughout the breadth and depth of the theater. The CJTF was organized along traditional lines. The overwhelming consensus among the Blue Staff was that the CJTF forces were too few and lacked the platforms/training to

effectively operate/occupy a country the size of NAIR. The most recurring problem throughout *UQ 04* was the inability of the CJTF to sustain a large force operating in a distributed mode across the extensive and complex terrain of Nair.

2. SUMESIA Lesser Contingency (LC). The SUMESIA scenario, set in Southeast Asia, involved the defeat of a counter-insurgency force that had threatened the stability of the government of the supported country. This littoral scenario provided Marine Forces the opportunity to operate in conjunction with Special Operations Forces (SOF) in missions to secure objectives at key airfields and towns. Marine Forces were able to demonstrate their strategic agility through force closure of the Future Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF [F]) MEB in theater, as well as its tactical flexibility through rapid transition from one mission to the next enabled by the seabase and through execution of Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM).

Unified Quest Game Design



11

Figure 2: The *UQ 04* Game Design

KEY FINDINGS AND ISSUES

1. Joint Seabasing (JSB) Concept

a. JFCOM (J-9) personnel introduced the JSB concept into *UQ 04* at the rudimentary level. While the Naval Force was able to demonstrate the flexible sustainment and maneuver options afforded by the Enhanced Network Seabase in both Nair and Sumesia, there is still a widespread belief in the joint world that seabasing only focuses on logistical capabilities and is base oriented.

JSB must be considered holistically within an *operational* concept of operations (including all warfighting functions) **that includes an operational maneuver as well as logistical dimension**. Additionally, the Marine Corps must continue to showcase in future Title X War Games how “dynamic seabasing” provides Naval forces the operational maneuver and tactical flexibility to present multiple dilemmas to an adversary.

b. The Army introduced the Army Regional Flotilla (ARF) and Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) into *UQ 04* as a potential means to flow and sustain forces in theater. However, the current level of interoperability between Army and Navy/Marine Corps Seabasing platforms and concepts remained unclear. This revealed a valid requirement to ensure that all future Joint Seabasing concepts and platforms are coordinated with each of the Services to ensure mutual supportability for the Joint force.

2. Joint Force Support Component Commander (JFSCC)

a. The JFCOM (J-9) Logistics Team provided a JFSCC concept brief to all participants prior to the first move of *UQ 04*. The JFSCC would conceivably provide a focal point for overall logistical authority in theater and would provide the commander of this organization the ability to procure capabilities (i.e., funding, personnel, equipment) that reside within the Service Components to support the Joint force. The JFSCC command structure was also injected into the NAIR scenario in order to stress it against the complex terrain, threat environment, and extended lines of communication of that environment.

b. The JFSCC was introduced by JFCOM to address current joint logistical shortfalls which include Total Asset Visibility, information flow; joint deployment enablers, joint economy of force and interoperability of logistics systems. These logistical issues are all related to logistical process, vice organizational concerns. Process changes must first be explored prior to instituting any organizational changes that may not support all the Service Components. No operational play in *UQ 04* validated the utility of the JFSCC construct. Finally, the Ground-centric nature of the JFSCC did not garner support from several of the other Services and united the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps in opposition to the idea of an organizational fix for a procedural problem.

3. **Major Combat Operations (MCO) and Stability Operations (SO) Over Extended and Complex Terrain.** In the Blue NAIR campaign, the difficulties experienced in fighting what amounted to a “Three Block-War” in urban and mountainous terrain while distributed throughout the country proved to be overwhelming. The enemy conventional force melted into the local population and the guerilla forces defended from the cities and focused their offensive action on interdicting Blue lines of communication. To compound the problem, the entire population of the country was unified in opposition to the CJTF mission of regime change. From a sustainment standpoint, the scenario would have been almost impossible to support. The lines of communication were simply too long. The manpower requirement to provide security for the supply routes made it impossible to mass the requisite force size to mount the multiple, high-intensity urban fights required. The seabasing and expeditionary sustainment capability of the Naval Forces provided flexibility and protection that the other portions of the CJTF did not enjoy. Terrain management was another attempted course of action to relieve operational tempo

of the ground forces. Though traditional boundary assignment techniques were used, vast stretches of the countryside that were sparsely populated and of seemingly little value were assigned as a responsibility to the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) to monitor with Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets. In addition, ground forces managed their terrain through the use of traditional boundaries with a focus on specific nodes. Naval Forces could not entirely secure the main supply routes, but outfitted every ground movement element with the ability to defend itself.

4. Tactical & Operational Air Lift From the Seabase. The NAIR scenario involved the difficult prospect of sustaining Blue Forces operating in northern regions of the theater located 800 to 900 nautical miles from the seabase. Attempts at supporting this deep inland fight revealed the requirement for a platform with the legs, capacity, in-flight refueling and expeditionary capabilities of a C-130 aircraft that could operate off the seabase. This requirement was especially true of the Marines, but also involved Army units operating far inland in Nair. Such an aviation platform should be able to operate, not only with the amphibious combatants, but also the MPF (F), ARF and AFSB vessels.

5. Global Positioning System (GPS) Jammers, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), Moving Target Indication (MTI) Jammers, and Ground Based Lasers (GBL)

a. Significant emphasis was given within the Red NAIR Theater Cell to coordinating ground movement with the employment of GPS jammers, SAR/MTI jammers and GBL's. Use of GBL's was not delegated below the Corps level, but employment of GPS jammers and SAR/MTI jammers was authorized down to the Brigade and Battalion. Timelines were set for activation of GBL's in targeting Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites followed according to scenario dependent sequence by jamming of GPS and SAR/MTI to disrupt movement along with the nearly simultaneous jamming of communications. The level of planning and attention to detail in developing use of these systems was most impressive.

b. In light of Commandant of the Marine Corps's recent decision to stand up the Information Operations and Space Integration Branch (PLI) within Plans, Policies & Operations (PP&O), Headquarters Marine Corps, and the importance the Army gave to wargaming GPS and SAR/MTI jamming along with the employment of GBL's in *UQ04*, consideration should be given to wargaming these capabilities during future Marine Corps sponsored wargames.

6. Effects Based Operations (EBO)

a. The EBO methodology was prevalent during staff planning sessions in the NAIR and SUMESIA Cells throughout *UQ 04*. When operations in either conflict required the application of kinetic force, the Joint Force usually executed this well. In both scenarios, however, there were situations where destruction of enemy capabilities should have been avoided, but was not. This was because the resulting effect could be easily measured and highlighted as evidence of success. More important than the application of kinetic force to achieve the desired effect was the requirement to apply non-kinetic force in the form of Psychological Operations (PO) and Information Operations (IO). This application of non-kinetic force was addressed during the war game, but was never properly coordinated and synchronized to support the respective operational

and tactical campaigns. The Air Force planners coordinated the IO effort during the game play, utilizing their technological capabilities to attack enemy networks. These efforts, though, lacked the cultural understanding, finesse, and nuance that temper the effects of technology. For some planners, this highlighted the inherent weakness of the EBO process to affect the non-kinetic realm.

b. It would be of value for future Marine Corps Title X War Game participants to include IO/PO training as part of the pre-game training sessions. The Information Operations and Space Integration Branch (PLI) of PP&O, HQMC, could perform this instruction. By conducting advance training, USMC participants would be better prepared to address IO/PO in a Joint environment.

7. Integrity of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). It became apparent that the majority of UQ 04 participants from the other Services were not familiar with MAGTF organization and capabilities. On more than one occasion, CJTF staff planners, in the name of “born Joint” and Joint interdependence, requested or recommended breaking-up the MAGTF structure in order to gain a specific capability to support another maneuver element. This type of thinking threatens the future integrity of the MAGTF. It is critical for Marine players to educate the Joint community during future war game events on the extraordinary force synergies of the MAGTF, that maximum effectiveness of USMC forces are rooted in this construct, and that, therefore, maximum benefit of Marine forces to the Joint force requires MAGTF integrity.