Unified Quest 2003 War Game (UQ 03)

A Marine Perspective

27 April - 02 May 2003

INTRODUCTION

Unified Quest 03, a co-sponsored Army and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Title X War Game, was conducted at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Formerly the *Army Transformation War Game (ATWG)* Service Title X Program, *UQ 03* integrated Army and JFCOM efforts to address significant future interoperability problems among the Services and joint community.

The focus of JFCOM's interest in *UQ 03* was to explore emerging Joint, Service and Interagency and associated capabilities for the successful conduct of a global campaign. The Army's primary interest was to explore the echelonment of the Objective Force, to examine urban warfare, and to examine technology enablers to deploy the future Army force.

ARMY/JFCOM UQ 03 OBJECTIVES

1. Integrated Global Operations: Explore the national, joint and Service capabilities required to conduct simultaneous, synchronized operations in support of regional and functional combatant commands.

2. Joint Concept Integration: Explore emerging Joint Operations Concepts alternatives and other Service, interagency, and multinational concepts to identify the integration requirements for the Objective Force Warfighting Concept, and to determine its level of integration.

3. Joint Effects Generation: Explore the Joint Capabilities required to create, support, and sustain effects generated by military forces conducting multiple, distributed operations in an interagency and multinational environment to dissuade, deter, or defeat any adversary across the full range of military operations.

4. Battle Command: Examine the Objective Force Battle Command concept to investigate alternative echelonment of the Army's joint capable headquarters above brigade during each phase of a campaign across the full range of military operations.

USMC UQ 03 OBJECTIVES

1. Examine the Seabase as a Joint Task Force (JTF) enabler.

2. Examine Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM) as a JTF enabler.

3. Highlight transformational USMC capabilities and platforms to further the development of the "Naval" team.

4. Examine the impact of the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) on STOM and forcible entry operations.

USMC PARTICIPATION:

One General Officer and seventeen Subject Matter Expert (SME) participants represented the Marine Corps at *UQ-03*. Brigadier General Zilmer (HQMC) was the senior USMC participant, with each of the other players being sourced through HQMC and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC).

GAME CONSTRUCT:

The scenarios played at the UNCLASSIFIED level in UQ-03 involved a full range of global conflicts in a 2015 timeframe. These included a Major Contingency Operation in Southwest Asia, a Lesser Contingency in Southeast Asia, and a Homeland Security mission. The UQ 03 scenarios are summarized below:

1. NAIR Major Contingency Operation (MCO). The Nair scenario, set in Southwest Asia, included three separate operational team structures (Nair 1-3), each designed to explore various Army structure echelonment concepts. The three different CJTFs, fighting the same notional enemy, were faced with unique intra-Army and Joint Command and Control challenges. This exploration aspect of the game was critical to U.S. Army game objectives, since it was intended to inform the ongoing Army studies to determine the most effective design of Objective Force Units of Employment, or those echelons above the Unit of Action (i.e. Brigade). Additionally, one of the CJTFs (Nair 3) was allocated additional experimental capabilities, or enablers, each chosen to represent what can reasonably be achieved in the 2020 timeframe if S&T and R&D were initiated in the near term. The Nair scenario allowed the Marines to showcase Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) through the ability to threaten the adversaries entire littoral region, Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) as a JTF enabler through forcible entry and demonstrate the Marine Air-Ground Task Force's (MAGTF) ability to conduct deep maneuver (demonstrating operational reach) from the seabase. Additionally, the scenario displayed the capability of the Future Maritime Prepositioning Force [MPF (F)] combined with an Amphibious Task Force (ATF) as a force multiplier, allowing near simultaneous operations on multiple objectives in the Nair Theater.

2. Sumesia Lesser Contingency (LC). The Sumesia scenario, set in Southeast Asia, involved the defeat of a counter-insurgency force that had threatened stability of the local government of Sumatra. This scenario provided the Marine Forces the opportunity to operate in conjunction with Special Operations Forces (SOF) during missions to secure objectives at key airfields and towns. The Marine Forces were able to demonstrate their strategic agility

through force closure of the MPF (F) MEB in theatre as well as its tactical flexibility through rapid transition from one mission to the next enabled by the seabase and through the execution of Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM).

3. Homeland Security (HLS). The HLS Team consisted of members from Northern Command (NORTHCOM), federal agencies, and the Services. The team responded to various threats against the United States including: pre-emption of a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) attack, defense against an attack of U.S. A/SPOD's, response to a radiological attack on a US city, and a response to a major earthquake (non-hostile disaster). Major HLS issues discussed included equipment shortfalls, the requirement for both a global maritime tracking system and nuclear material tracking system, and the competition for US forces during a major contingency operation. The HLS scenarios were not connected to the other two.

KEY FINDINGS AND ISSUES

1. Navy and Marine Corps Wargaming Strategy

a. The Navy and Marine Corps should develop a Naval wargaming strategy and associated objectives based on Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW), Sea Power 21, the Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations, and appropriate supporting concepts and Concepts of Operation. Such objectives should be plugged into appropriate Service and Joint war games as part of a multi-year wargaming plan that ensures key Navy, Marine Corps, and Naval issues are fully explored in a deliberate and systematic fashion. Additionally, it would ensure that the same Naval picture is employed in all future wargames.

b. UQ 03, while an extremely comprehensive wargame, reinforced the requirement for the Services to continue development through the use of service sponsored Title X games. Such events are essential to obtain the fidelity necessary to address Service-specific issues that do not lend themselves to in-depth assessment during co-sponsored Joint wargames.

2. Seabasing Concept

a. Seabasing, defined as the integration of the Carrier Strike Group, Expeditionary Strike Group, and Maritime Prepositioning Group into a dynamic capability able to accomplish at-sea arrival and assembly, selective offload, sustainment, and reconstitution/redeployment and underwrite all warfighting functions in area denial/anti-access environment, showed its utility to Naval forces during *UQ 03*. However, there is still a widespread belief in the joint world that seabasing only focuses on logistical capabilities and is base oriented. The Marine Corps must continue to showcase how "dynamic seabasing" provides Naval forces the operational maneuver and tactical flexibility to present multiple dilemmas to an adversary; i.e., that seabasing is an operational, as opposed to a merely logistical capability.

b. At a starting position for both the Nair and Sumesia scenarios, the at-sea arrival and assembly phase of MPF MEB personnel to MPF(F) ships had already occurred. The Flow in

Echelon (FIE) movement of MPF MEB forces continues to be an area that requires resolution regarding projected availability and utilization of future lift assets to accomplish this function.

c. During *UQ 03*, there was much discussion between Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and the Services on the true definition of "Joint Seabasing." There are two trains of thought:

- Seabasing supporting selective warfighting functions.

- Attempting to seabase the Joint force.

Discussions between Navy and Marine Corps participants revealed that the following seabasing capabilities might be required to support the Joint Force:

- Dynamic, to exploit the vast maneuver space afforded by the world's waterways.

- Static, to support the Regional Combatant Commander/Joint Task Force Commander's need to prosecute an extended land campaign, as well as the need to establish basing capabilities in the face of area denial strategies; e.g., a mobile offshore base capability).

d. The Army is currently reviewing its current afloat prepositioned stock program to identify enhancements to the next generation of prepositioning ships. The MPF(F) can support selected joint warfighting capabilities, but will probably not be able to accommodate a significant flow of Army forces through MPF(F) platforms in its current programmatic form. Considering JFCOM and the other Services are currently exploring future seabasing and prepositioning capabilities, the Navy and Marine Corps should ensure that such capabilities are designed in tandem so that all the pieces can fit and work together. There is a valid requirement to ensure that all forms of future seabasing and prepositioning platforms are designed with the right "hooks" to ensure mutual supportability for the Joint Force.

3. **Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM).** The Marine forces in each of the *UQ-03* scenarios conducted OMFTS and STOM operations, focusing on STOM as the tactical implementation of OMFTS. The USMC played STOM based on the current STOM Concept of Operations (CONOPS) as a departure point. The most aggressive application of this CONOPS was a STOM operation to seize an objective 300 nautical miles from the seabase, conducted in Nair. Operational reach was enabled by long range MV-22 Osprey and Carrier Strike Group aircraft. Once at the STOM objective, the MARFOR led a combined Task Force and supported it with organic Command and Control (C2) assets that had reach back to the seabase. The USMC should continue to effectively wargame OMFTS and STOM in order to gain better fidelity on the operational reach of STOM operations.

4. **Integrated C4I.** Due to the extended range and complexity of operations, Command and Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) will be severely stressed by Joint Force operations in the littorals during the 2015 timeframe. The challenge will be to ensure that ForceNet enables those future joint operations. The Marine Corps must work with the Navy to develop a capabilities-based requirements process to encompass all ForceNet requirements. It is important that ForceNet be fully ingrained in all future wargaming strategy. A C4I Workshop

should be coordinated with appropriate representation from MCCDC and the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) in order to formulate a final C4I strategy within the ForceNet construct.

5. **Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Aviation.** The integration of Marine tactical air (TACAIR) within the sea base, and how this would affect the current Omnibus Agreement that grants the MAGTF Commander operational control of his organic air assets, was examined during *UQ 03*. An organic TACAIR capability is a key element in preserving the integrity of the MAGTF. It is essential that this issue be addressed to determine if all future USMC seabased aviation assets, to include unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV's), will be covered under the Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. Additionally, further experimentation should be conducted regarding future MAGTF TACAIR to validate all required updates to current joint doctrine.

6. **Joint Operations Logistics**

a. During *UQ 03*, JFCOM introduced and played the Joint Logistics Component Commander (JLCC) concept. The JLCC construct pulled Marine CSS units under it as opposed to the MAGTF Commander. Unfortunately, the opportunity to explore the JLCC concept in depth was limited logistics play was not very detailed. Maintaining an organic CSS capability is another key element to preserve the integrity of the MAGTF. HQMC (I&L) and MCCDC should carefully watch the further development of the JLCC concept and its possible implementation in the context of maintaining MAGTF control over its CSS units.

b. In the Nair scenario, Army Units of Action (UA) possessed dedicated CSS elements that were flown into the objective area. Subsequent discussion with Army logistics planners indicated that they had not sized those CSS elements to also support CJTF's Marine force. During a subsequent phase of the Nair scenario, CJTF placed a sizeable Army force (2 Mechanized UAs and an Airborne Brigade) under the Operational Control (OPCON) of the JFMCC. However, there was no formal identification of support responsibilities between the JFMCC / MARFOR and the OPCON Army units. It evolved that the Army was still responsible for the support these UAs under the OPCON arrangement. The key finding here is a requirement to refine key joint and related Service logistical command relationships for future Title X War Games. In this regard, MCCDC and TRADOC should coordinate a Joint Logistics Workshop prior to the next *UQ* event to formally identify logistic roles between the Services using the parameters of the JLCC construct.

7. **SEAWAY Collaborative Planning Assessment Tool (CPAT).** Marine planners utilized the SEAWAY CPAT during *UQ 03* to assess support requirements and feasibility OF various MAGTF/JTF schemes of maneuver. In the Nair scenario, SEAWAY was employed to provide feasibility assessment for the MEB STOM scheme of maneuver to secure an APOD approximately 300 nautical miles inland. SEAWAY validated that the MAGTF had adequate aviation lift support to conduct this STOM operation. In Sumesia, SEAWAY was used to estimate the feasibility of urban CONOPS planned for by the MARFOR. Recommend that the USMC continue to utilize CPATs similar to SEAWAY in future war games to support the Marine planners while continuing to exercise and evaluate the system's capabilities.

8. **Homeland Security (HLS).** The *UQ-03* HLS Team addressed four separate vignettes involving the defense of the United States against terrorism. However, HLS Team play was isolated, with no game interaction with either the Sumesia or Nair Teams. The HLS Team could have been integrated into the Blue Teams to deal with the important issues of interagency coordination, strategic lift and force apportionment. In the Sumesia scenario, for example, the HLS Team could have responded to enemy terrorist attacks inflicted by the Red Force on the US to disrupt the deployment of forces from CONUS. Appropriate HLS operations and issues should be given heightened visibility during future war games.

9. **War Game Rules of Engagement (ROE).** Prior to *UW 03,* the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) – that Service's sponsoring agency -- announced that only future systems that were Service Programs of Record (POR) could be injected into the game. Both the Navy and Marine Corps complied with this guidance, inserting only current PORs (e.g., the MV-22) in the game. The Army, however, utilized both Joint Tilt-Rotor (JTR) and Quad Tilt-Rotor (QTR) Aircraft in both the Nair and Sumesia scenarios, which are not current Army PORs. Utilizing the QTR aircraft allowed the Army Objective Force a greater operational capability in order to deploy their forces. It is essential that these ROE be aggressively and clearly resolved prior to, and adhered to during future Title X and related large wargaming venues. A "level playing field" for all Services is essential.

10. **Game Construct.** The *UQ-03* game design was very "cartoon-centric" with a good deal of time and energy consumed by the Blue Teams in producing daily deliverables.
These consisted of the creation of cartoon map graphics to correspond with the Blue Force concept of operations for each phase of the Nair and Sumesia operations. *This emphasis on technical innovations caused the game to lose its intended focus – experimentation and the examination of new and emerging concepts and capabilities*. The *UQ-3* game objectives could have been better served through a seminar game approach, with interactive gaming conducted in a near real-time format, instead of the daily quest for the presentation of deliverables and the time-consuming process of feedback from the Assessment Team.